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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
 
 
 
STATE OF TEXAS, et al. 
 
   Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
  v. 
UNITED STATES, et al. 
 
   Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
No. 15-40238 
 
 
 
 
 
APPELLANTS’ EMERGENCY MOTION  
FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Government seeks an immediate stay pending appeal of a 
nationwide preliminary injunction against the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).  The Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) seeks to effectively prioritize 
the removal of aliens who have recently crossed the border, committed crimes, or 
threaten public safety and national security by, inter alia, establishing guidelines for 
considering requests for temporarily deferring removal of other aliens who pose no 
such threats and have longstanding and close family ties to the United States.  The 
preliminary injunction restrains the exercise of that prosecutorial discretion, a 
quintessentially executive function that is traditionally unreviewable.  In so doing, it 
undermines the Secretary’s authority to enforce the Nation’s immigration laws by 
disrupting the Secretary’s comprehensive effort to effectively allocate limited 
enforcement resources. 
The district court’s order is unprecedented and wrong.   The Constitution does 
not entitle States to intrude into the uniquely federal domain of immigration enforce-
ment.  See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).  Yet the district court has 
taken the extraordinary step of allowing a State to override the United States’ exercise 
of its enforcement discretion in the immigration laws.  The court invented a novel 
theory of Article III standing that purports to confer standing on States without any 
actual injury.  In the alternative, the court purported to find a cognizable injury to 
Texas based on indirect economic costs that are not the subject of these policies, that 
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federal law does not obligate Texas to bear, and in disregard of the expected 
economic benefits of these same policies – a standing theory that would radically 
expand the ability of States to intrude into this uniquely federal domain. 
On the merits, the district court erred in holding that DHS violated the notice 
and comment requirements of the APA.  The Secretary issued a memorandum that 
announces guidelines for the agency’s exercise of enforcement discretion.  It is a 
quintessential example of a general statement of policy, which the APA exempts from 
notice and comment.  The court compounded these errors on standing and the APA 
by entering an overbroad injunction that restricts DHS nationwide, including in 
plaintiff States not found to have standing, and more remarkably, in States not parties 
to this litigation and that actively support the challenged policies. 
In short, the preliminary injunction is a sweeping order that extends beyond the 
parties before the court and irreparably harms the Government and the public interest 
by preventing DHS from marshalling its resources to protect border security, public 
safety and national security, while also addressing humanitarian interests. In contrast, 
the plaintiffs will suffer no cognizable harm if a stay is granted. 
The Government moved for a stay in the district court on February 23.  On 
March 9, the district court issued an order that postpones action on any pending 
motions.  In light of the urgent circumstances and critical federal interests at issue, 
including the need to protect national security, public safety, and the integrity of the 
border, the Government now seeks a stay from this Court.  The Court should stay the 
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injunction in its entirety or, at the very least, stay it with respect to implementation in 
States other than Texas, or States that are not parties to this suit.  We request that the 
appellees be directed to respond within 7 days after the filing of this motion and that 
the Court act on the motion within 14 days after the filing of the motion.  The facts 
supporting emergency consideration of this motion are true and complete.  We have 
notified the appellees of the filing of this motion by phone and email.  Appellees have 
not yet responded, but they have opposed the request for a stay in the district court. 
STATEMENT 
 
I. Legal Background. 
 
A. Congress has vested the Secretary with broad discretion over the administra-
tion and enforcement of the Nation’s immigration laws, authorizing him to “establish 
such regulations; . . . issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems 
necessary for carrying out his authority.”  8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (emphasis added).  This 
authority expressly includes discretion to establish and effectuate priorities regarding 
the removal of aliens. See 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (directing Secretary to “establish national 
immigration enforcement policies and priorities”).  
Establishing removal priorities is essential to the faithful execution of the 
Nation’s immigration laws. An estimated 11.3 million undocumented aliens are 
present in the United States.  See Attachment 5, p. 9.  Yet recent funding has allowed 
DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to annually remove fewer 
than four hundred thousand aliens, including aliens newly apprehended at the border.  
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Id.  Thus, following Congressional policy, DHS has focused its limited resources on 
criminal aliens, threats to national security, and recent border crossers.  See Consol. 
Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. F., Tit. II, 128 Stat. 5, 251 (2014); 
DHS Appropriations Act 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142 (2009).  Executing 
those priorities, DHS removed approximately 2.4 million aliens from 2009 through 
2014.  Migration Policy Institute, Deportation and Discretion 13, 15 (October 2014); 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/dhs-releases-end-year-statistics (2014). 
 B. To effectively focus its efforts on aliens who are priorities for removal, DHS 
must decide which of the 11 million aliens it will not expend its limited resources to 
remove.  One longstanding form of this enforcement discretion is “deferred action,” 
an administrative decision to defer, for a limited time, the removal of aliens who are 
low priorities for removal.  Attach. 3, p.2.  Such a decision can be revoked at any time.  
Id.  Longstanding DHS regulations, promulgated after notice and comment, provide 
that an alien subject to deferred action may receive employment authorization upon a 
showing of economic necessity.  See 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14).  
 The practice of making aliens eligible to request deferred action based on 
various criteria has been an established feature of immigration policy for decades.  See 
Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 193-94 (D.D.C. 2014).  Congress has approved, 
and even directed, the use of deferred action on multiple occasions.  See id. at 194. The 
Supreme Court has cited with approval the Executive’s “regular practice (which had 
come to be known as ‘deferred action’) of exercising that discretion for humanitarian 
      Case: 15-40238      Document: 00512966899     Page: 5     Date Filed: 03/12/2015
5 
 
reasons or simply for its own convenience.” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1999). 
C. In 2012, in a policy known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(“DACA”), DHS announced that certain aliens brought to the United States as 
children may request deferred action.  Attach. 2.  Aliens may not be considered for 
deferred action under DACA unless they satisfy the threshold criteria.  DACA 
requests are evaluated on a case-by-case basis by immigration officers who review 
whether an alien satisfies the threshold criteria and whether other factors militate 
against deferred action.  Id.  Plaintiffs have not challenged the 2012 DACA policy. 
D.  In November 2014, the Secretary issued a series of guidance memoranda to 
further focus DHS enforcement efforts on national security, border security, and 
public safety.  In one memorandum, the Secretary issued new polices for prioritizing 
removal of those aliens who pose a threat to national security, public safety, or border 
security, placing priority on removal of recent illegal border crossers, aliens convicted 
of serious criminal offenses, and aliens who engage in or support terrorism.  Attach. 4. 
Another memorandum, the 2014 Deferred Action Guidance, broadened the 
eligibility criteria for aliens to be considered for deferred action under DACA.  Attach. 
3, pp. 3-4.  The broadened DACA eligibility criteria were to be implemented by 
February 18, 2015.  Id. at 4.  The Guidance also permits certain aliens to request 
deferred action under a policy, known as “DAPA,” that is focused on aliens who are 
parents of U.S. citizens or of lawful permanent residents.  Id. at 4-5.  To request 
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deferred action under DAPA, an alien must, inter alia, have a child who is a U.S. 
citizen or who is a lawful permanent resident, have continuously resided in the United 
States since before 2010, and not represent a threat to national security, border 
security, or public safety.  Id.  Requests for deferred action under the Guidance are to 
be assessed “on a case-by-case basis,” and deferred action can be revoked at any time.  
Id.  Recipients of deferred action under DAPA may receive work authorization where 
there is economic necessity.  Id.  The DAPA process was to be implemented by May 
19, 2015.  Id.  Starting November 24, 2014, the Guidance extended the length of 
deferred action from two to three years for all DACA recipients, including those 
requesting deferred action under the original 2012 DACA criteria, and established the 
same period for DAPA.  Id. at 3, 5. 
II. Procedural Background. 
 
 A.  Plaintiff States sued, claiming that the newly announced deferred action 
guidelines violate the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 3, Cl. 5, the 
APA’s notice-and-comment requirement, 5 U.S.C. § 553, and the APA’s substantive 
requirements, 5 U.S.C. § 706.  On February 16, 2015, the district court issued a 
preliminary injunction that prohibits the Government from implementing “any and all 
aspects or phases” of DAPA and “any and all aspects or phases of the expansions 
(including any and all changes)” to DACA, as outlined in the 2014 Guidance.  Order, 
pp. 1-2.  The order prohibits implementation not only in Texas, but also in plaintiff 
States that have not been found to have standing—and in States that are not parties to 
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the suit, including ones that support these policies. 
With respect to the threshold issue of Article III standing, the court rejected 
the plaintiff States’ primary argument that the broadened deferred action will injure 
them by prompting further illegal immigration, because the court concluded that such 
a harm “is too attenuated” to support standing. Op. 56. But the court held that 
implementation of the Guidance will injure “at least one plaintiff, Texas.” Id. at 67.  
First, the court concluded that Texas, and possibly other plaintiff States, would 
incur costs in issuing driver’s licenses to aliens granted deferred action and work 
authorization.  In response to the argument that such costs are a consequence of the 
plaintiff States’ choices and taken on voluntarily, the court sought to rely on Arizona 
Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014), which held that Arizona 
violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying driver’s licenses to DACA recipients 
based on state-created alienage classifications. The district court suggested that the 
Government would treat any state effort to limit the issuance of driver’s licenses as 
illegal, Op. 25, ignoring the Government’s explanation that the Guidance does not 
“compel[] States to provide driver’s licenses to DACA and DAPA recipients so long 
as the States base eligibility on existing federal alien classifications,” Attach. 9, pp. 6-7. 
The court further suggested that standing could be predicated on a novel 
“abdication” theory, which the court acknowledged was “not well-established.”  Op. 
57, 61. While recognizing that the Federal Government retains plenary authority over 
immigration policy, the court suggested that States could establish Article III standing 
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by showing that the Government had “abdicated” that authority.  Id. at 57-67. 
The court declined to rule on plaintiffs’ substantive claims. Id. at 121-22.  
Instead, the court relied exclusively on the claim that the Guidance should have 
undergone notice and comment.  Id. at 110.  The court concluded that the plaintiff 
States would suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction because the 
grants of deferred action would be “virtually irreversible” and the States would incur 
unrecoverable costs. Id. at 115.  The court stated that the Government would not be 
harmed by an injunction that preserves the status quo. Id. at 119. 
B.  The Government moved for a stay in the district court on February 23.  On 
March 9, the court issued an order postponing action on any pending motions.  
Attach.11.  The court instead scheduled a hearing on March 19 concerning an 
advisory submitted by the Government concerning DHS’s grant, prior to the issuance 
of the preliminary injunction, of three-year periods of deferred action and work 
authorization for requests submitted under the unchallenged 2012 DACA criteria (see 
Attach. 3, p. 3), and plaintiffs’ request for discovery regarding that matter.  On March 
12, the Government made a supplemental filing that explained that the March 19 
hearing is not germane to the stay motion.  See Attach. 12.  The filing informed the 
district court that, in view of the urgency of obtaining a stay of the preliminary 
injunction and the court’s postponement of action on any motions, the Government 
is now proceeding to this Court.  Id. at 1; see FRAP 8(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
ARGUMENT 
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Four factors govern a request for a stay pending appeal: (1) whether the 
movant is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer 
irreparable harm absent a stay; (3) whether a stay will substantially harm the other 
parties; and (4) whether a stay serves the public interest.  See Planned Parenthood v. 
Abbott, 734 F.3d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 2013). Where the balance of equities tilts strongly 
in favor of a stay, the moving party “‘need only present a substantial case on the 
merits when a serious legal question is involved.’”  United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. 
Ctr., 711 F.2d 38, 39 (5th Cir. 1983).  Applying these standards, the preliminary 
injunction was an extraordinary overreach that should be stayed pending appeal.   
I. This Case Is Not Justiciable Because Plaintiffs Lack Standing. 
 
Article III standing requires an injury that is (1) concrete, particularized, and 
actual or imminent; (2) fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) redressable by 
a favorable ruling. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013).  The 
district court found standing, at least for Texas, on two grounds. Both are wrong, and 
prudential considerations also weigh strongly against entertaining this suit.  
A. The plaintiff States cannot establish standing based on the district court’s 
“abdication” theory—a theory that the plaintiffs did not advance, that the district 
court recognized is novel, see Op. 61, and that no other court has concluded could 
support Article III standing.  The theory is baseless because it confuses the merits of 
the States’ substantive APA claim with the threshold question of standing.  Whether 
or not DHS is acting within its lawful discretion, a State cannot bring a suit without 
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demonstrating that it has suffered concrete, cognizable injuries as a result of the 
agency action. This is an “irreducible” constitutional requirement of Article III. Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  Moreover, the court’s reasoning 
allows States to bring suit—absent any identifiable harm—to challenge the 
Government’s exercise of enforcement authority in an area that Congress has 
committed exclusively to the federal Government.  It thus turns the established bar to 
any State entitlement to a role in the field of immigration enforcement into a 
justification for allowing the States to interfere with federal immigration discretion 
through the courts. 
The district court’s underlying premise is also wrong.  Far from “abdicating” its 
authority to enforce the Nation’s immigration laws, DHS is vigorously enforcing 
those laws, removing 2.4 million aliens from 2009 through 2014.  See p. 4 supra.  
Because the number of aliens subject to removal vastly outstrips the resources that 
Congress has given DHS to remove them, DHS must decide which cases to prioritize.  
Consistent with Congress’s direction, DHS has prioritized the removal of criminal 
aliens, national security threats, and recent border crossers, and has correspondingly 
chosen to defer the removal of certain aliens who, among other things, are not 
dangers to public safety or national security, entered the United States years ago, and 
whose removal would impose significant humanitarian costs.  Far from “abdication,” 
this is responsible enforcement in the face of real-world constraints. 
B. The court also erred in finding that Texas had standing based on financial 
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costs it allegedly will incur when aliens who receive deferred action and obtain work 
authorization apply for driver’s licenses.  This harm is indirect, speculative, and not 
cognizable.  Nothing in the Guidance requires aliens who receive work authorization 
to apply for licenses, requires States to issue licenses to these aliens, or requires States 
to charge a particular fee.  Any economic impact Texas may incur due to issuing 
driver’s licenses at a particular cost is thus the same indirect and incidental impact that 
States incur any time DHS grants any alien work authorization for any reason.  
Such an indirect impact provides no basis for standing to challenge an agency’s 
policies regarding the exercise of enforcement discretion.   “[P]rivate persons . . . have 
no judicially cognizable interest in procuring enforcement of the immigration laws by 
[DHS].”  Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 897 (1984); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard 
D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (a private plaintiff “lacks standing to contest the policies 
of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened 
with prosecution”).  The same rule applies to States, which may not interfere with the 
federal Government’s ordering of immigration enforcement priorities.  See Arizona, 
132 S. Ct. at 2499. 
Texas’s claims of financial harm also ignore the prospect that deferred action 
and work authorization will lead to increased state tax revenues from aliens working 
legally.  See Attach. 10, p. 6 (amicus estimate that implementing the Guidance in Texas 
may lead to $338 million increase in the state tax base over five years).  Indeed, the 
district court recognized the possibility of “economic benefits that States will reap by 
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virtue of these individuals working, paying taxes, and contributing to the community.”  
Op. at 54.  Given the potential for such gains to offset cost, Texas has not shown that 
indirect financial harm is “certainly impending.”  Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148. 
The financial costs of issuing driver’s licenses are also “self-inflicted injuries.”  
See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1152.  Contrary to the district court’s view, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Arizona Dream Act left States free to issue and charge fees for 
driver’s licenses as they see fit, as long as their licensing schemes satisfy rational-basis 
scrutiny. See Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 2015 WL 300376, at *9 (D. Ariz. Jan. 
22, 2015).  Nor did the Government argue that federal preemption principles require 
States to issue licenses to deferred action recipients.  States may choose to issue 
driver’s licenses to deferred action recipients or not, as long as they base eligibility on 
federal immigration classifications rather than creating new state-law classifications of 
aliens.  The district court’s assumption that the federal Government would contest the 
legality of any effort by States to deny driver’s licenses to deferred action recipients, 
Op. 25, disregards the Government’s express statements.  See Attach. 9, pp. 6-7.  
The district court’s driver’s-license standing theory is subject to no limiting 
principle. If accepted, it could allow States to sue DHS any time it grants any alien 
work authorization and the State allows work authorization to be the basis for 
obtaining a benefit under state law.  Indeed, the court’s theory would seem to give 
States standing to sue the Federal Government over any policy that has any collateral 
economic consequences for the States, including when state policies themselves cause 
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such an economic consequence.  This would radically alter the balance between the 
States and the federal Government and insert Article III courts into policy disputes 
between them.  This Court has already rejected a strikingly similar theory, explaining 
that state expenditures on services for undocumented aliens “are not the result of 
federal coercion” nor legally attributable to the actions of federal immigration 
authorities. Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 666 (5th Cir. 1997).  
C. Compelling prudential considerations also weigh against entertaining this 
challenge.  Courts are properly reluctant to interfere with the administration of the 
Nation’s immigration laws. “The obvious need for delicate policy judgments has 
counseled the Judicial Branch to avoid intrusion into” the field of immigration. Plyler 
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982). And the fact that States have brought this suit further 
counsels caution.  The “responsibility for regulating the relationship between the 
United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the 
Federal Government” rather than the States. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976) 
(emphasis added); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 (emphasizing breadth of “federal 
power to determine immigration policy”). Accordingly, this Court dismissed as non-
justiciable Texas’s claim that the federal government had “failed to enforce the 
immigration laws and refuse[d] to pay the costs resulting therefrom.” Texas, 106 F.3d 
at 666. That this suit threatens “state interference with the exercise of federal powers” 
thus presents “an important argument against standing.” Pennsylvania ex rel. Shapp v. 
Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  
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II. The Government Is Likely To Prevail On Appeal. 
The United States is also likely to succeed on appeal because plaintiffs’ claims 
fail on their own terms.  At the outset, the States lack an APA cause of action because 
an agency’s decision not to undertake enforcement action involves discretionary 
judgments regarding resource allocation and other factors that are not amenable to 
judicial oversight and is presumptively unreviewable under the APA.  Heckler v. Chaney, 
470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). For the same reasons, judicial review of the exercise of 
enforcement discretion under the INA is precluded by law, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), and 
the prospect of judicial intrusion into a matter so closely tied to the protection of the 
Nation’s borders and foreign relations provides compelling grounds for denying relief, 
5 U.S.C. § 702.  Moreover, the States are not within the zone of interests protected by 
any relevant provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  See Ass’n of 
Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).  Nothing in the INA 
suggests that Congress intended for States to challenge the Secretary’s exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion as to third-party aliens.  Cf. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 897.  
On the merits, the district court erred in holding that the plaintiff States are 
likely to succeed on the notice-and-comment APA challenge. The Guidance is a 
“general statement of policy,” which the APA expressly exempts from notice and 
comment, because it “advise[s] the public prospectively of the manner in which the 
agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.”  Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 
(1993) (citation omitted); see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).   Specifically, the Guidance 
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describes how DHS will exercise its preexisting discretion in deferring the removal of 
low-priority aliens for a limited and revocable period.  Cf. Dept. of Labor v. Kast Metals 
Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1155 (5th Cir. 1984) (agency plan for allocating resources by 
focusing safety inspections on employers with highest injury rates did not require 
notice and comment); American Hosp. Ass’n  v. Bowen, 834 F.3d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(publication of enforcement-allocation criteria did not require notice-and-comment).  
 In treating the Guidance as a substantive rule, the district court erroneously 
suggested that it entitles deferred action recipients to obtain the ability to work 
lawfully and to receive other affirmative benefits.  Aliens who receive deferred action 
may be granted work authorization where there is economic necessity, but that is not 
due to the Guidance; it is due to an agency regulation originally promulgated in 
1981through notice-and-comment rulemaking.  See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14); 46 Fed. 
Reg. 25079-03, 25081 (May 5, 1981).  Under the APA, once is enough.  See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b).  And a grant of deferred action does not confer a right to a driver’s license 
under the REAL ID Act.  States need not participate in the REAL ID program, and if 
they do, the Act does not require them to give licenses to aliens with deferred action; 
it merely allows proof of deferred action to satisfy one of the Act’s requirements.  See 
Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 202(c)(2)(B)(viii), 119 Stat. 231, 313 (2005). 
The district court also erred in reasoning that the Guidance is not a “statement 
of policy” because it supposedly establishes a “binding norm” compelling subordinate 
DHS agents to grant deferred action whenever the guideline criteria are met.  Op. 108 
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(quoting Professionals & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 596-97 (5th 
Cir. 1995)); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
Neither Shalala nor Young remotely suggests that a superior officer cannot bind his 
subordinates without going through notice and comment.  Rather, Shalala and Young 
considered whether the agency had “bound itself.”  Young, 818 F.2d at 948 (emphasis 
added); see Shalala, 56 F.3d at 600 (notice-and-comment not required where “the 
policy does not foreclose the agency’s exercise of its discretion in bringing an 
enforcement action” (emphasis added)).  Here, DHS retains unfettered discretion to 
revoke any grant of deferred action at any time, and the Secretary could revoke the 
Guidance at any time.  And unlike in Young, the Guidance uses retrospective criteria 
that do not create a new “norm” for the future primary conduct of a regulated entity. 
Moreover, the Guidance leaves the Secretary’s agents with discretion regarding 
issuance of deferred action through implementation of the Guidance.  The Guidance 
expressly provides that even when the threshold criteria are satisfied, “the ultimate 
judgment as to whether an immigrant is granted deferred action will be determined on 
a case-by-case basis.”  Attach. 3, p. 4.  The record below shows that DHS in fact has 
denied deferred action under the 2012 DACA guidelines for aliens who meet the 
threshold criteria but nonetheless do not warrant a favorable exercise of discretion.  
Attach. 6,  ¶¶ 18-24.   Accordingly, the district court in Arpaio correctly found that 
DHS will retain case-by-case discretion and that case-by-case review has taken place 
under DACA.  27 F. Supp. 3d at 193-94, 209-210. 
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III. The Balance Of Harms And Public Interest Favor A Stay. 
The Government will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay.  An injunction 
interfering with immigration enforcement, issued at the behest of the States, offends 
basic separation-of-powers and federalism principles and impinges on core Executive 
functions.  The injunction therefore necessarily causes the Government an irreparable 
harm that will not be cured even if Defendants ultimately prevail. 
The injunction also irreparably interferes with DHS’s ability to protect the 
Homeland and secure our borders.  Deferred action helps immigration officials 
distinguish criminals and other high-priority aliens from aliens who are not priorities 
for removal and whose cases may additionally burden already backlogged 
immigrations courts.  See Attach. 7, ¶¶ 14-17; Attach. 8, ¶¶ 7-10.  Rather than wasting 
resources determining whether encountered individuals are enforcement priorities, 
DHS would be able to rely on proof of deferred action to quickly confirm that they 
are not.  See id.   Enjoining the Guidance thus will “mak[e] it more difficult [for DHS] 
to efficiently and effectively carry out its mission.”  Attach. 7, ¶ 17. 
The court’s assertion that the preliminary injunction merely preserves the status 
quo, Op. 119, is misplaced.  The focus of the irreparable-harm inquiry “must be on 
prevention of injury by a proper order, not merely on preservation of the status quo.”  
Canal Auth. of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974).  In any event, the 
court issued its injunction less than 48 hours before DHS was scheduled to begin 
accepting requests under the modified DACA eligibility criteria on February 18.  See 
      Case: 15-40238      Document: 00512966899     Page: 18     Date Filed: 03/12/2015
18 
 
Attach. 3, p. 4.  Thus, the court set back substantial preparatory work that DHS had 
already undertaken, including leasing space and initiating the hiring process for 
employees.  Op. 76 n.55. Compelled cessation of these efforts jeopardizes 
implementation of the policy, and resuming and completing the preparatory work 
necessary for implementation will involve additional burdens.  Cf. Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 
F.2d 555, 571 (5th Cir. 1981) (granting stay to relieve state agency of “burden . . . in 
terms of time, expense, and administrative red tape” of complying with order). 
By contrast, the plaintiff States will suffer no harm if a stay is granted. The 
plaintiffs have not shown that DHS’s implementation of the Guidance will cause 
them any cognizable injury, much less irreparable harm.  Although the district court 
credited Texas’s claim that it will spend “millions of dollars” to provide driver’s 
licenses to future deferred action recipients, Op. 115, it is state law that makes licenses 
available to such individuals and specifies the fee.  And Texas is likely to receive 
offsetting financial benefits through increased state tax revenues.  See p. 11 supra. 
Finally, the interests of the public and of third parties strongly favor a stay. 
DAPA and the expansion of DACA will advance important border-safety, public-
safety and national-security goals in the public interest.  By preventing DHS from 
implementing its chosen approach for best administering the immigration laws, the 
preliminary injunction harms not only DHS, but also the public. The injunction also 
impairs the humanitarian interest of providing temporary relief for close family 
members of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents.  Furthermore, local law 
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enforcement will be deprived of the benefits of deferred action, which encourages 
aliens who are not enforcement priorities to cooperate with law enforcement officers 
where they might otherwise fear coming forward.  See Attach. 8, ¶ 13.  And state and 
local governments will lose potentially significant new payroll tax revenue.  
IV. At the Very Least, This Court Should Confine the Operation of the 
Preliminary Injunction To Texas or To the Plaintiff  States 
Even if the plaintiffs were entitled to preliminary relief, the injunction issued by 
the district court is drastically overbroad.  Twenty-four States are not parties to this 
action, and a dozen States have participated as amici to oppose the plaintiff States’ 
challenge.  Yet the court enjoined DHS from implementing the Guidance nationwide, 
barring implementation in States that do not oppose it and in States that support it. 
For the reasons set forth above, the injunction should be stayed in its entirety. 
Given the absence of a finding that any State other than Texas has standing, the 
injunction must be stayed in all States except Texas.  But at the very least, this Court 
should stay the injunction insofar as it bars implementation of the Guidance outside 
of the plaintiff States.  Cf. Dep’t of Def. v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939 (1993) (staying 
nationwide injunction insofar as it “grants relief to persons other than” named 
plaintiff).  A nationwide injunction flouts the settled principle that an injunction 
“should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide 
complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979); see also 
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984) (stressing importance of allowing 
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development of the law through litigation in multiple courts). The possibility that 
Texas might eventually have to spend more money issuing driver’s licenses, based on 
its own policy choices and subject to offsetting tax revenues, provides no basis for a 
single district court to enjoin the Guidance throughout the country.  
The plaintiffs suggested that the APA mandates nationwide injunctive relief by 
providing for courts to “set aside” unlawful agency action.  5 U.S.C. § 706.  But the 
APA does not require courts to issue injunctions at all, much less nationwide 
ones.  See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (authorizing declaratory judgments “or” injunctions).  
Moreover, 5 U.S.C. § 706 is inapplicable because it concerns a court’s remedial 
authority at the end of litigation, not the scope of preliminary relief.  Preliminary 
injunctions under the APA are governed by 5 U.S.C. § 705, which provides that, “to 
the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury,” the reviewing court “may issue” orders to 
“preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings” (emphasis 
added). That language makes clear that preliminary injunctions are discretionary and 
must be tailored to irreparable injury.  Here, no State suffered irreparable injury, and 
even if a plaintiff had a cognizable injury, a nationwide injunction is manifestly 
excessive when other States expect to be benefited by the challenged policies. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the preliminary injunction should be stayed pending 
appeal.  At a minimum, the injunction should be stayed with respect to: (1) States that 
are not parties to this suit; and (2) plaintiff States other than Texas. 
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